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Introduction
During the last few years of WOII, the world was faced with the arrival of nuclear weapons. It 
didn’t take long until a regime developed that wanted to oversee and limit the spread of nuclear 
technology,  which  is  indicated  for  example  with  the  The  Acheson-Lilienthal  &  Baruch  Plan 
(forming a basis for international oversight on nuclear technology) in 1947, the UN Irish resolution 
(forming a basis for two articles of the NPT) in 1961 and the Partial Test Ban Treaty (slowing the 
spread of nuclear technology and the nuclear arms race) in 1963. In 1970 the most successful of all 
efforts to regulate nuclear technology and -weapons entered into force,  the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  (hereafter:  NPT).  With  that  treaty,  the  concept  of  nuclear 
(non-)proliferation, and the non-proliferation regime, was officially established. In the NPT, nuclear 
proliferation is defined as the spread of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons, and non-proliferation 
then would mean prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. This treaty has been the cornerstone of 
the international non-proliferation regime ever since. However, between the Cold War and now, the 
bipolar power system changed drastically. This subsequently changed the security environments, 
seen as one of the main motivators for nuclear proliferation, of many states. Even though the current 
world status is very different from when the nuclear proliferation regime was first established, it 
seems like many of the current nuclear issues still show an approach typical for the Cold War. With 
this thesis, I want to explore the influence of the current multipolar state system on the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. I am arguing that the Cold War non-proliferation regime is currently under 
stress because of the change in world power order since the Cold War. Supporting the idea that the 
regime is  under  stress  is  the  fact  that  there  are  countries  that  try  to  free  themselves  from the 
obligations of the NPT, or have already done so.1
Helping to formulate an answer to this question, there will be a focus on the concept of 
‘nuclear latency’ - having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons - as offering a solution for better 
understanding,  and  perhaps  applying,  the  non-proliferation  regime  on  current  affairs.  Nuclear 
latency  is  defined  by  Scott  D.  Sagan,  one  of  the  most  notable  academics  regarding  nuclear 
proliferation, as “a measure of how quickly a state could develop a nuclear weapon if it chose to do 
 Pavel S. Zolotarev, “Approaches to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Multi-Polarity,” In Future of the Nuclear 1
Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop, ed. Joint Committees on the Future 
of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Policy 
and Global Affairs, National Academy of Sciences and Russian Academy of Sciences (New York: The 
National Academies Press, 2009), 229.
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so from its current state of technological development.”  Nuclear latency is not new: historically 2
speaking multiple states have, or have had, the possibility to produce nuclear weapons but chose not 
to.  However,  it  has  become an  increasingly  important  concept  in  scholarly  research  regarding 
understanding states’ current nuclear behavior.  The most important feature of nuclear latency is 
possessing  enrichment  and  reprocessing  (hereafter:  ENR)  facilities.  States  pursuing  dual-use 3
technology are adding a new dimension to the non-proliferation regime, because technically, there 
could be many latent nuclear states that possess nuclear weapons within a few years. 
The current non-proliferation regime is not taking nuclear latency into account enough. A 
multipolar system is generally regarded as an unstable system and in that regard, there could be 
several  explanations  why nuclear  latency thrives  now:  it  could  provide  security  in  an insecure 
environment,  it  could give potential  regional  powers more bargaining power and leverage,  and 
many states simply have the technical possibility nowadays. So far, most of the academic literature 
on nuclear proliferation has focussed on the spread of nuclear weapons technology, however more 
and more states legally possess dual-use technology not especially designed for weapons. This is 
something that the NPT hasn’t been taking into account, which provides political scientists with a 
great points of critique for the current non-proliferation regime. For example Dong-Joon Jo and 
Erik  Gartzke found a strong positive correlation between latent nuclear states and the initiation of a 
nuclear weapons program. They state that “the inhibiting effect of the NPT is overcome by the 
stronger technological diffusion effect”.  Another political scientist, Jacques Hymans, states that he 4
does not want to abandon the NPT regime, but that he does have doubts concerning the tendency to 
adjust the treaty with ever heavier supply side-controls. Many scholars agree, the non-proliferation 
regime and its cornerstone need updating.
Ultimately, the question that this thesis will formulate an answer for is “does the concept of 
nuclear latency provide the basis for an adaptation of the Cold War non-proliferation regime?” The 
opening chapter of this research paper is  mostly theoretical:  it  examines the fundaments of the 
nuclear proliferation debate and builds the theoretical framework. This, in order to, in a later stage 
of this research, be able to extract the elements that changed since the immediate post-Cold War era, 
and indicate what elements have not been adapted in the current non-proliferation regime. This 
chapter includes an explicit focus on the differences between realist approaches and organisational 
 Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation,” In Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 2
21st Century, Vol. 1, ed. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukatzhanova, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010: 90.
 Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, “Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset,” 3
Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, no. 4 (2015): 444.
 Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation,” 84.4
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approaches on nuclear proliferation and looks at the different thoughts on what motivates nuclear 
proliferation. Also, as a part of describing the Cold-War non-proliferation regime, the first chapter 
discusses  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(hereafter the IAEA). The NPT being the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and the IAEA 
being the main international safeguards inspectorate, it is important to see how the regime works 
and is influenced by political developments.
As in any theoretical discussion, there are optimists and -pessimists. Proliferation optimists, 
like the renowned political science scholar Kenneth Waltz, also the founding father of neo-realism, 
are  of  the opinion that  nuclear  proliferation ensures  stability  between states.  Although nuclear 5
stability permits lower-level violence, those disruptive behaviours do not outweigh the higher-level 
peace and stability that nuclear weapons create, according to Waltz.  Critics of the neo-realistic 6
approach believe the opposite, that when more states acquire nuclear capabilities, it accounts for 
instability between states. This is an important difference of opinion when thinking about the needs 
of  a  multipolar  state  system,  generally  regarded  as  an  unstable  state  system.  Examples  of 
pessimistic scholars include Colin H. Kahl and Liam Maddrell. I discuss the different arguments 
that these academics make use of and point out the relevance of these arguments for the issue of the 
change to a multipolar competitive state system.
The second chapter aims to show the developments in the global state system during recent 
years,  and the subsequent consequences for nuclear proliferation dynamics. It  is because of the 
change  to  a  multipolar  world,  that  regional  dynamics  play  an  increasingly  important  part  in 
international  relations,  and  also  when  discussing  nuclear  ambitions:  especially  the  feeling  of 
security of many states that used to, for example, be protected by the U.S. umbrella is one of the 
aspects  that  changed  greatly,  compared  to  the  Cold  War-period  from  which  the  most  non-
proliferation theories originate. This chapter discusses the influence of China as a rising power in 
the world and the degrading worldwide position of the United States. 
The third chapter discusses and connects the concept of nuclear latency as a post-Cold War 
phenomenon. States could reduce their vulnerability before acquiring nuclear weapons, namely by 
developing sensitive  dual-use  nuclear  technology.  This  chapter  positions  nuclear  latency in  the 
current  non-proliferation  regime  and  indicates  that  nuclear  latency  will  become  increasingly 
common. Among other arguments, it is suggested that the amount of nuclear energy is increasing in 
importance in the global energy equation, especially in Asia. This means that the non-proliferation 
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers no. 171 (1981). 5
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm.
 Colin H. Kahl and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Iran and the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, October, 2012. https://6
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-07-17/iran-and-bomb.
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regime can not deny the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to states because of this rising 
importance of nuclear energy. The ultimate goal of the first three chapters is to make clear how the 
current  situation  challenges  the  Cold  War-originated  nuclear  non-proliferation  regime,  and  to 
provide a basis for analysing how the regime is handling, or should be handling, states with latent 
nuclear capabilities.
In order to find out to what extent the current non-proliferation regime indicates an classic or 
“new” approach, which indicates that the regime is adapting to the new situation, this research 
examines three case studies. Japan is a case study because the concept of nuclear latency partly 
stems from this state’s nuclear behaviour (nuclear latency is sometimes called “the Japan option”). 
Iran and South Korea are two states that are believed to have latent nuclear capabilities, but do not 
pursue nuclear weapons. The situation that currently plays in Iran and the Middle-East is an good 
example of a situation that has changed as a result of the new world dynamics. The main goal of the 
Iran case study is to find out to what extent the Iran deal reflects modern or outdated thinking with 
regards to the non-proliferation regime. It aims to indicate whether the deal tried to implement the 
same approach as has been used since the Cold War, or whether it shows that concessions were 
made that reflected the fact that the non-proliferation regime is trying to function in a different 
world.
This research paper ultimately engages in the ongoing scholarly debate on the applicability 
of  the  current  non-proliferation  regime  to  the  present-day  international  situation  and  seeks  to 
provide  insights  on  where  the  difficulties  lie  when  discussing  nuclear  proliferation  in  current 
conditions. This happens through literature research and case studies on Japan, Iran and South-
Korea.  All  chapters  taken  together  should  extensively  explain  to  what  extent  the  nuclear 
proliferation regime is effective in a multipolar world and how (if at all) it has been adapted to take 
into account ‘nuclear latency’.  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Chapter 1
The Non-Proliferation Regime
This first chapter forms the basis of this thesis. In search of the answer to whether nuclear latency 
provides  a  basis  for  adapting the existing non-proliferation regime,  it  first  explores  the several 
viewpoints on nuclear proliferation and looks at the establishment of the non-proliferation regime. 
This chapter indicates to what extent the regime is based on aspects characteristic of the Cold War- 
and immediate post Cold War-era, and of a bipolar world. This chapter is formed as following: first 
it discusses the most important theoretical approaches on nuclear proliferation, in order to see what 
aspects drive the spread of nuclear weapons. Through, among others, papers written by authorities 
on nuclear (non-)proliferation like Tanya Ogilvie-White, Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, the 
first  part  of this chapter explains the basic viewpoints on nuclear proliferation and focusses on 
theoretical  ideas with regard to nuclear  proliferation and polarity.  Proliferation theorists  can be 
divided into optimists and pessimists, Sagan and Waltz are opposites in that regard. The difference 
lies in whether nuclear proliferation is expected to ensure a more- or less stable international state 
system. Next to the theoretical  framework, this chapter also explores how the non-proliferation 
regime  formed.  It  discusses  the  years  that  ultimately  lead  to  the  establishment  of  the  non-
proliferation regime. It also explores the basis and the review process of the cornerstone of the non-
proliferation regime, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in order to 
indicate the legal fundaments of the regime and the adaptability of the non-proliferation regime to 
new situations. Ultimately, this chapter examines to what extent the non-proliferation model is built 
on circumstances specific to the bipolar power system during the Cold War. 
1.1 The nuclear proliferation debate
The  theoretical  debate  on  nuclear  proliferation  is  a  very  complicated  and  broad  one.  Nuclear 
weapons are a sensitive subject, which makes it difficult to research adequately because of, mainly, 
the  lack  of  unclassified  evidence.  This  raises  the  question  of  how adequate  our  knowledge  of 
nuclear proliferation is.  The complication of this debate also lies in the fact that the definition of 7
‘nuclear  proliferation’ isn’t  clear  in  many cases.  In  this  research I  hold on to  the definition of 
nuclear non-proliferation as described in the NPT, which suggests that nuclear non-proliferation 
means  prohibiting  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons:  “[…] In  conformity  with  resolutions  of  the 
 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary 7
Debate,” The Non-Proliferation Review 4, no. 1 (1996): 43.
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United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of 
wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.”8
So, to ask the same question that many nuclear proliferation scholars have been asking for 
years: what causes states to want to pursue nuclear weapons? There can be several, very diverse, 
answers to this question.  The causes of nuclear proliferation can be divided in three main groups of 9
hypotheses: technological determinants, focussing economical development and the declining cost 
of weapons, external determinants, emphasizing the role of the security environment and domestic 
determinants, emphasizing domestic factors.  Technological determinist literature emphasizes that 10
a state will develop nuclear weapons within a matter of years, as soon as they acquire the latent 
capacity to do so. This literature suggests that a state’s latent capacity is determined by economic 
prosperity,  literacy  levels  and  scientific  development.  Flowing  from this  viewpoint,  pessimistic 
thoughts  on  the  limitations  of  nuclear  proliferation  arose  with  policy  makers.  Although  this 11
literature provides a good start in analysing nuclear proliferation, it does not provide conclusive 
arguments for explaining it entirely.
The second class of hypotheses argues that external determinants mainly influence nuclear 
proliferation. This literature emphasizes the willingness- rather than the ability of states to pursue 
nuclear  weapons.  The  most  important  arguments  that  this  literature  presents  for  nuclear  non-
proliferation are the presence of security guarantees from a powerful alliance partner, or the absence 
of security threats. In other words, realist explanations emphasize the importance of the shape of a 
state’s threat environment.  Classical realists focus on external pressures of states,  basing their 12
assumptions  on  the  idea  that  states  are  unitary  actors  seeking  to  survive  in  a  competitive 
international system. They see the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the rational response to protect 
the state, since security is the most important factor in a state’s survival.  13
 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/140).” International Atomic Energy 8
Agency, April 22, 1970. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/
infcirc140.pdf
 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary 9
Debate,” The Non-Proliferation Review 4, no. 1 (1996): 43.
 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” The 10
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 862.
 Singh and Way, 862.11
 Idem, 863.12
 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary 13
Debate,” The Non-Proliferation Review 4, no. 1 (1996): 44.
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One of the most notable scholars in the area of external determinants literature is neo-realist 
Kenneth Waltz, who uses rational deterrence theory in his research.  Rational deterrence theory 14
argues that once more than one state has acquired nuclear weapons, war between those states is 
unlikely  because  mutual  destruction  is  almost  assured.  Neo-realism  is  based  on  the  same 
assumptions  as  classical  realism,  but  with  one  assumption  added:  that  the  structure  of  the 
international system influences international politics and can explain international outcomes. At the 
end of the Cold War, the change in polarity (from bipolarity to unipolarity), a renewed interest for 
the  influence  on  nuclear  proliferation  dynamics  emerged.  The  interaction  between polarity  and 
nuclear weapons became the utmost concern for neo-realists.  Waltz is an proliferation optimist: he 15
argues that the more countries acquire nuclear weapons, the higher international stability is.  More 16
on nuclear proliferation optimism and pessimism follows in the course of this chapter. The external 
determinist explanations have dominated thinking about nuclear proliferation since the 1950s.
More recently, scholarly attention has partly shifted from the technological- and external 
determinants  to  a  third  class  of  literature,  the  domestic  determinants  literature,  to  provide 
explanations  for  nuclear  proliferation.  These  theories  put  importance  on  the  role  of  domestic 
sources and (political) organisations in nuclear proliferation. An influential scholar in this class is 
Scott D. Sagan. Sagan uses organisational theory to challenge the central assumption of realists that 
states  are  rational  actors.  Much of  his  thoughts  relate  to  the bureaucratic  politics  approach,  an 
approach that argues that “policy outcomes result from a game of bargaining among a small, highly 
placed group of governmental actors.”  Sagan is Waltz’s (and rational deterrence’s) fiercest critic. 17
Both Sagan and Waltz’s main concern has been to understand the impact of nuclear weapons on 
international peace and stability.  However, they are on opposite ends of the nuclear proliferation 18
spectrum. Sagan is an proliferation pessimist,  which means that he beliefs that nuclear weapons 
destabilize the world.19
 Tanya Ogilvie-White, 45.14
 Idem, 46.15
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers no. 171 16
(1981). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm.
 Brent Durbin, “Bureaucratic Politics Approach,” Brittanica, Last modified January 24, 2018. https://17
www.britannica.com/topic/bureaucratic-politics-approach.
 Tanya Ogilvie-White, 51.18
 Tanya Ogilvie-White, 51.19
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1.2 Proliferation or non-proliferation?  
As mentioned before, the interaction between polarity and the spread of nuclear weapons became an 
important part of research for neo-realist Waltz, and for his opponent Sagan. In finding out what 
role nuclear latency plays/could play in the non-proliferation regime, it is useful not only to look at 
the different views on what possibly motivates the spread of nuclear weapons, but also to look at 
arguments  on  whether  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  would  make  the  world  a  safer  or  more 
dangerous place, and to what extent polarity plays a role in nuclear proliferation.
In  thinking  that  nuclear  weapons  account  for  a  more  stable  state  system,  proliferation 
optimists argue that new nuclear powers would quickly settle into mutual deterrence with their 
rivals.  Waltz, the most popular proliferation optimist, obviously draws lessons from the fact that 20
mutually assured destruction during the Cold War reduced conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union.  With  his  1981  paper  “The  Spread  of  Nuclear  Weapons:  More  may  be  Better”,  Waltz 
provided a  clear  case for  this  camp.  However,  despite  his  stance that  nuclear  proliferation is 21
desirable  (provided  it  is  a  slow  spread  of  nuclear  weapons),  Waltz  in  his  later  works  does 
acknowledge that nuclear weapons don’t account for the same level of stability and international 
peace in a multipolar world as in a bipolar world. This shows for example in his comments on the 
pattern  known as  the  “stability-instability  paradox”.  This  paradox  proposes  that  in  the  current 
multipolar world, the supposed stability that nuclear weapons bring generates instability because all 
provocations, disputes and conflicts that aren’t ‘nuclear’ seem okay. Waltz’s comments on this topic 
don’t  deny  this  paradox,  that  stability  brings  instability,  but  he  does  argue  that  smaller-scale 
(conventional)  provocations and (conventional) conflicts are far less disruptive compared to the 
stability that nuclear weapons bring on a world-scale.22
Proliferation pessimists, like Sagan, argue that technological and organisational problems 
could easily disturb deterrence stability. In his 1994 article “The Perils of Proliferation”, Sagan was 
one  of  the  first  to  make  a  serious  case  for  the  pessimistic  camp.  His  argument,  motivated  by 
organisational theory, is  that nuclear proliferation increases the likelihood of the use of nuclear 
weapons, through for example accident, theft, intentional decision or miscommunication. The only 
way, Sagan argues, to handle the danger of nuclear proliferation is by tight and sustained civilian 
control of the military. However, according to Sagan there are strong reasons to believe that future 
 David J. Karl, “Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 4 20
(2011): 619.
 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers no. 171 (1981). 21
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm.
 Colin H. Kahl, and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Iran and the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, October, 2012. https://22
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-07-17/iran-and-bomb.
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nuclear armed states lack such mechanisms of civilian control. This is because many of the states 
that  show  strong  interest  in  nuclear  weapons  are  military-run  governments,  or  have  weak 
governments where the military imposes great influence on policy-making.23
For years, especially during the Cold War, the optimist camp has been the dominant camp.  24
After  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  the  proliferation  pessimist  camp  gained  more  attention.  The 
deterrence ideas (a state will refrain from a nuclear attack against its adversary if it is convinced it 
might suffer unacceptable damage in a second strike) that the optimist camp utilize are challenged 
in the post-Cold War era. This has to do, among other things, with nuclear weapon states that try to 
challenge the power relations, regional rivalries between nuclear weapon states and the danger of 
terrorists  obtaining nuclear weapons.  An other argument is  drafted by Jeffrey W. Knopf,  partly 
inspired by Scott Sagan, in where he aims to illustrate how domestic politics and the economic 
impact of nuclear weapons programs may adversely affect the prospects for regional stability.25
Living in a bipolar- or multipolar world could mean a great difference in terms of the spread 
of nuclear weapons. According to Waltz, the fall of the Soviet Union was the start of Cold War 
alliances weakening, which in turn also meant the disappearance of a nuclear umbrella over some 
states.  He argues that  this  speeds up the proliferation process because a  disappearing nuclear 26
umbrella accounts for feelings of insecurity within those states, which is possibly compensated for 
by acquiring their own nuclear weapons.  There are many scholars that believe, which is backed by 27
the most popular nuclear proliferation theories, that nuclear proliferation is, at least to a certain 
extent, powered by the amount of security guarantees. The possible consequences of the current 
multipolar system on nuclear (non-)proliferation will be discussed in the second chapter.
1.3 Development of the non-proliferation regime
On December 8th 1953, President Eisenhower held his “Atoms for Peace” address, which paved the 
ideological groundwork for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NPT.  The 28
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, is seen as the cornerstone of the 
 Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of 23
Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, no. 4 (1994): 68.
 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate,” Security Studies 12, no. 1 24
(2002): 44.
 Jeffrey W. Knopf, 43.25
 Ogilvie-White, 47.26
 Idem, 47.27
 Daniel H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 28
2011), 9.
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international non-proliferation regime. As the Atoms for Peace address indicates, the ambitions to 
regulate and oversee the spread of nuclear technology already began in the first stages of nuclear 
weapons technology research, during and immediately after WWII. 
In 1946, ’Resolution 1’ was the first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and 
the first resolution on regulating atomic energy. With this resolution, the General Assembly created 
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which consisted of a representative of each state in the 
Security  Council  and Canada.  Later  in  1946,  U.S.  representative  in  the  AEC Bernhard Baruch 
proposed  to  establish  the  International  Atomic  Development  Authority  (IADA),  a  treaty-based 
organisation that owned and managed all atomic research and production facilities on behalf of all 
nations.  According to  the  Baruch plan,  the  United  States,  as  only  state  to  possess  the  (secret) 
information for a full nuclear fuel cycle, was not to be subject to the IADA until the organization’s 
control regime was fully established and also to maintain a strategic advantage over the Soviet 
Union.  The Soviet Union in turn offered a counterproposal that would create two treaty regimes: 29
one  to  outlaw  nuclear  weapons,  and  one  to  organise  the  controls  of  the  AEC  and  guarantee 
procedures for the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This proposal would have 
normalised  the  U.S.  advantage,  and  put  the  disarmament  efforts  in  the  hands  of  national 
governments  instead  of  an  international  organisation.  These  conflicting  proposals  lead  to  a 30
compromise, ‘Resolution 41’,  in December 1946. It was adopted by 10 votes to none, and the 
Soviet Union abstained from voting this round in the Security Council.  However, the resolution 31
was not a great success. Because of the political impasses and fundamental differences of opinion 
between  the  Security  Council  superpowers,  the  U.N.  could  not  function  properly  and  make 
substantial progress on implementing and executing the resolution.32
The  next  substantial  progress  in  regulating  nuclear  energy  was  President  Eisenhower’s 
Atoms for Peace speech in 1953. This speech discussed three principles, that eventually formed the 
three ‘pillars’ on which the non-proliferation treaty was built: non-proliferation, disarmament and 
peaceful use of nuclear technology. What was especially important from this address, with regards 
to  the  developing non-proliferation  regime,  is  that  as  soon as  1953,  the  dual-use  capability  of 
nuclear  technology was  recognised.  With  dual-use,  I  mean that  nuclear  technology could  have 
civilian and military applications. With regards to the production of fissile material from uranium, 
 Daniel H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7.29
 Daniel H. Joyner, 7.30
 “Armaments: Regulation and Reduction (S/RES/18(1947)),” United Nations Security Council, 1947. 31
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/18(1947): 13.  
 Daniel H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 9.32
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the processes are almost identical whether the materials are produced for nuclear warheads or for 
peaceful purposes.  The difference lies only in the extent and duration of the application of the 
process on to the uranium.33
Between  1958  and  1961,  efforts  to  control  nuclear  proliferation  made  much  progress 
because of proposals by Ireland to the U.N. General Assembly, later to be known as the ‘Irish 
Proposal’. This resolution is seen as the basis of forming the concept of non-proliferation as used in 
the NPT. The Irish Minister of External Affairs, mr. Frank Aiken, seemed to understand the dangers 
of  nuclear  proliferation  and  how  to  formulate  them  in  a  way  that  spoke  to  all  superpowers. 
Ambassador Mohamed Shaker explained that Aiken understood that: “While nuclear weapons were 
in the hands of a few highly developed states which had much to lose and little to gain by a nuclear 
war, and therefore felt a sense of deep responsibility regarding their use, the smaller States would 
have much less to lose and a temptation to exploit the enormous temporary advantage deriving from 
the possession of these weapons.”  The superpowers supported the proposals from early on. The 34
proposals were developed for three years until in December 1961 a proposal on the prevention of 
wider dissemination of nuclear weapons passed unanimously by the General Assembly.
Throughout  the  years,  the  negotiations  towards  complete  disarmament  were  proceeding 
very slow.  Even with the general support of the superpowers, it wasn’t until 1965 that the next 35
significant  step towards  a  multilateral  non-proliferation treaty  was achieved:  General  Assembly 
Resolution 2028, the formulation of guiding principles of the NTP. The five principles that this 
resolution  contained  became  important  guiding  considerations  for  a  treaty  text  on  non-
proliferation.  However, the meaning and interpretation of these principles became subject to much 36
debate.  Up until  that  moment  the  superpowers  had been focussing on non-proliferation almost 
exclusively. The other pillars that together with non-proliferation would form the NPT, disarmament 
and the peaceful  use of  nuclear  technology,  weren't  mentioned once in  U.S.  and Soviet  Union 
proposals up until the treaty proposals of 1967.37
1.4 The NPT and the IAEA  
All principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures concerning nuclear non-proliferation 
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come together in the NPT. It embodies the international community’s efforts on three terrains, or 
‘pillars’: disarmament, nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.  The treaty 38
opened for signature in 1968, went in effect in 1970 and was extended indefinitely by 1995. 191 
states have joined the treaty, including the five nuclear weapon states. India, Pakistan and Israel 
have  never  signed  the  treaty  and  North-Korea  withdrew  from  the  treaty  in  2003.  The  NPT 
recognises two groups: Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). 
The former group consists of China, Russia, the United States, France and the United Kingdom: 
states that exploded a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967. The latter 
consist of the remaining signatory states. The nuclear weapon states are also the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council. The treaty is build on a ‘grand bargain’ between the two 
groups.  The NWS could keep their nuclear arsenals but pledged to disarm completely in time (as 39
described  in  Article  VI  of  the  NPT),  and  in  exchange  the  NNWS received  access  to  nuclear 
materials and technology for peaceful and civilian uses. However, in order to actually make use of 
this  right,  the  NNWS have  to  accept  safeguards  and  verifications  by  the  International  Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), something that isn’t  as specifically mentioned for the NWS. Since the 
establishment of the non-proliferation regime, the superpowers have been the main enforcers of the 
regime. This is for example indicated by Andrew J. Coe and Jane Vaynman. The two superpowers, 
as  divided  as  they  were  agreed  that  only  they,  together  with  the  PRC,  France  and the  United 
Kingdom, were  responsible  enough to  handle  nuclear  weapons and think about  how to  handle 
nuclear technology.40
The roots of the non-proliferation regime were connected deeply and influenced greatly by 
the global bipolar power situation and tensions between the superpowers. Because of the ideological 
battle  between East  and West,  and because  of  the  power  positions  of  these  states,  an  efficient 
process of formulating a non-proliferation treaty was prohibited. So, by means of reviewing the 
NPT, to what extent can the treaty, or the non-proliferation regime, adapt to new circumstances? 
The general review process is as follows: as stated in Article VIII of the treaty, the NPT is reviewed 
every  five  years  during  Review Conferences  (RevCon).  These  Review Conferences  review the 
implementation of the NPT during the preceding five years. They are preceded by three or four 
Prepatory Committee Meetings (PrepCom). In 2015, the most recent (ninth) Review Conference 
 “Module 1: Introduction,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Accessed June 18, 2018. http://tutorials.nti.org/npt-38
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took place  at  the  United  Nations  headquarters  in  New York.  Its  objective  was  to  review the 41
maintenance of the treaty since 2010.42
The IAEA is an international agency, established by the U.N. in 1957 in order to promote 
the peaceful use of nuclear power. This agency consists of an system of inspections and safeguards 
that  was  intended to  prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear  technology for  the  development  of  nuclear 
weapons.  After 1968, the IAEA became an important part of the NPT because NNWS had to enter 43
into IAEA safeguard agreements and accept international inspections of all their ENR facilities. 
However, the IAEA was initially only authorised to inspect declared nuclear sites, and not suspected 
nuclear  sites,  which  means  the  safeguards  system was  never  meant  as  a  complete  verification 
regime.  The limitations of the IAEA’s ability to prevent nuclear proliferation (clandestine states 44
could just not disclose a nuclear site and then the IAEA could not inspect that site) became more 
apparent  and controversial  when the agency started doing unannounced ‘special’ inspections  at 
undisclosed sites in Iraq (1992) and in North Korea (1993). These two events led to a systematic 
effort to strengthen the safeguard system and to make inspections more effective, and intrusive, in 
preventing nuclear proliferation.45
In order to try and solve the apparent problem of having too limited access to nuclear sites in 
order  to  timely  discover  violates  of  the  IAEA agreements,  in  May  1997  the  IAEA Board  of 
Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol: a standard text that could conclude additional 
agreements to the general safeguard agreements. As of May 2017, Additional Protocols are in force 
in 129 states, and in 19 states the Additional Protocols are signed and have yet to be brought in 
force.  More  on  the  Additional  Protocols  and  its  effects  on  the  non-proliferation  regime  is 46
discussed during the case studies.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the fundaments of the non-proliferation regime that still applies today. It 
firstly indicated that the nuclear proliferation theoretical debate shows many different opinions and 
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many uncertainties in the area of what causes the spread of nuclear weapons. This is due to concepts 
not being adequately defined, and uncertainty on what actually constitutes as knowledge in the 
study field of nuclear proliferation. Also, most scholars accept, some even stress, that it probably 
isn’t either the one or the other but rather a certain combination of all theories. This accounts for 
diverging viewpoints on what causes nuclear proliferation. The different viewpoints can be divided 
in  three  classes:  technological-,  internal-,  and  external  determinants.  Looking  at  the  nuclear 
proliferation debate, and discussing nuclear proliferation optimism and -pessimism is useful when 
thinking  about  nuclear  latency  (during  the  second  chapter)  and  how  it  relates  to  the  non-
proliferation regime. Focussing on the nuclear proliferation theoretical debate explains how scholars 
think nuclear proliferation, and implicitly non—proliferation, is influenced by changes in polarity. 
Proliferation  optimist  Waltz  is  seen  as  one  of  the  most  influential  academics  on  nuclear 
proliferation, although his arguments have lost some of their explanatory power in a multipolar 
world. Since the post-Cold War period, there has been more research into the pessimistic side of 
nuclear proliferation, shedding a more critical light on the nuclear proliferation debate. The second 
part of this chapter looked at the history- and establishment of the non-proliferation regime. The 
non-proliferation regime is a product of the Cold War, with clearly much influence and weight from 
the nuclear weapon states. All principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures concerning 
nuclear non-proliferation come together in the NPT. The IAEA is an international agency which 
became an important part of the NPT because NNWS had to enter into IAEA safeguard agreements 
and  accept  international  inspections  of  all  their  ENR facilities.  The  unstable  regional  security 
environments as a result of the new global multipolar order, together with a basis following from 
the Cold War global situation, the non-proliferation regime could account for great proliferation 
risks since it accounts for feelings of insecurity and discrimination with NNWS. Proliferation risks, 
as the next chapters will point out, currently out themselves as nuclear latent states. Since it  is 
impossible to adapt the power structure of the world, adaptation in order to solve this problem needs 
to come from within the regime, from the NPT and IAEA.  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Chapter 2
 From Bipolarity to Multipolarity: How Polarity Changes Influence Compliance With the 
Non-Proliferation Regime
In order to be able to discuss what would be good (policy) options to adapt in the current non-
proliferation regime, this chapter discusses the influence of multipolarity on the non-proliferation 
regime. This chapter firstly addresses the changes in polarity after the Cold War and subsequent 
consequences regarding the global system of security guarantees. During the first chapter it was 
established that  in external  determinist  literature,  for  years  the most  dominant  view on nuclear 
proliferation, the status of security environments plays an important role in nuclear proliferation. 
This chapter aims at explaining how the world changed in that regard and how those changes have 
influenced nuclear (non-)proliferation. This chapter discusses the changes that the most powerful 
nuclear actors went through, and how these changes could influence the nuclear behavior of smaller 
actors. In order to reach its goal, this chapter looks at several issues. Firstly, it takes a focus on the 
changing positions of the three currently most  important  nuclear actors,  The United States,  the 
Soviet  Union and China,  in  the world.  The U.S.  and Soviet  Union used to provide a  “nuclear 
umbrella” to its allies, but it looks like this umbrella has been altered, or at least partly withdrawn. 
China is growing immensely and is becoming one of the most powerful states in the world. Also, 
the change of attitude towards the NPT is looked at more closely. While during the first years of the 
NPT most countries supported this treaty, throughout the last years this multilateral support has 
declined greatly. States feel the NPT is unfair and discriminating.
2.1 From a bipolarity to multipolarity 
Polarity describes any of the several ways that power is distributed over the global system. During 
the Cold War a bipolar system existed: two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, built two 
alliance  systems  and  were  the  main  enforcers  of  the  non-proliferation  regime.  Those  alliance 
systems provided enough security and control to limit (altough not entirely) the amount of states 
that pursued their own nuclear weapons.  Waltz argues that in a bipolar world, in this case during 47
the Cold War,  the two great  powers relied mainly on themselves,  meaning there was no equal 
sharing  of  the  (for  example  military)  burden,  comparing  to  earlier  alliances  systems.  The  two 
superpowers,  the  U.S.  and  the  Soviet  Union,  relied  on  their  own  capabilities  instead  of  the 
 Carol Kessler, “Post-Cold War Effects on the Non-Proliferation Regime,” Problems of Post-Communism 47
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capabilities of allies. This is what Waltz called balance by ‘internal’ means. He states that internal 
balance is more reliable and precise than ‘external ‘balance.  48
Waltz argues that competition in a multipolar system is more complicated than in a bipolar 
system because “uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states grow and estimates of the 
cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make.”  Global security expert Carol Kessler 49
argues that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the non-proliferation regime started becoming 
strained. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the states that fell under its nuclear umbrella had to seek 
security by other means. This thought is supported by Sing and Way, who also noticed how the 
withdrawal of superpower security guarantees has created incentives for smaller powers to acquire 
nuclear weapons.  Next to that, the global power that the United States enjoyed after the Cold War 50
contributed for a large part to the resurfacing of nuclear proliferation as an international security 
problem.  Kessler  argues  that  for  the  non-proliferation  regime  to  succeed,  history  shows  that 51
almost absolute multilateral consensus is needed, something that is not fully the case in the current 
world. Multilateral consensus reassures states that the growth of nuclear weapons is not in any of 
the state’s security interests.  This part of the second chapter focusses on the most important global 52
power relations and changes therein since the post-Cold War era. Because, as chapter one indicated, 
the global powers have been the main enforcers of the non-proliferation regime since it formed, 
changes in those relations could influence the workings of the non-proliferation regime as a whole. 
Next to the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia, China has also become an important player within 
the non-proliferation regime.
2.1.1 The United States and the non-proliferation regime
Since the establishment of the non-proliferation regime, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were the main enforcers of the non-proliferation regime during the Cold War. After the end of the 
Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States as a hegemonic power 
increased strains on the non-proliferation regime. It is arguable that during the post-Cold War era, 
although Washington still possesses immense military power, the leadership position of the United 
Stated has deteriorated which has accounted for credibility issues among other NWS and NNWS.
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The First- and Second Gulf War in 1991 and 2003 respectively were crucial events in terms 
of the global leadership position of the United States. The First Gulf War was the first event that 
influenced how balance of power would be re-established after the Cold War and the subsequent 
invasion of Iraq, the Second Gulf War, triggered the rejection of Washington’s leadership by the 
international community.  During these years, there were rising concerns, by for example China, 53
that arms control was little more than a tool of American hegemony.  Fuelling this rejection of 54
American leadership, and the feelings of NNWS of being discriminated against, is the strategy of 
selective reinforcement that the United States currently pursues. Washington is ignoring enrichment 
and reprocessing activities of states it considers to be ‘good’, and punishes the same actions of 
states that are considered to be ‘evil’.  55
Since  Donald  Trump was  elected  president,  he  has  taken  a  decidedly  different  turn  on 
American  nuclear  policy  than  his  predecessor  Barack  Obama.  The  goal  of  the  Obama 
administration with regards to nuclear weapons was decreasing reliance of states on those weapons, 
taking a modern pessimistic  stance on nuclear  proliferation.  In contrast,  Trump’s 2018 Nuclear 
Posture  Review  and  2018  National  Defense  Strategy  to  many  experts  are  clear  examples  of 
embracing nuclear competition and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, which indicates the 
opposite  of  the  strategy  that  the  Obama  administration  adopted.  Instead  of  working  towards 
reducing nuclear dangers, the current U.S. nuclear policies show an outdated view that does not 
comply with today’s threats, enforcing a more dangerous world, nuclearly speaking.56
2.1.2 China: a rising power in the non-proliferation regime
A key new factor in the changing power order since the end of the Cold War is the emergence of 
China. Nuclear strategy expert Brad Roberts argues that China grew towards being a regional power 
in Asia, and is also destined to emerge as a pole in the global system. Its strategic goal is to emerge 
as a modern power, approximately by the middle of the century. During the last decade, China has 
been very engaged in a broad modernisation of its strategic forces.  Between 1989 and 1999 the 57
world  saw  an  unprecedented  growth  of  Chinese  engagement  in  arms  control  and  the  non-
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proliferation regime.  This growth of China as a nuclear and global power accounts for tensions 58
and nuclear  instability,  especially in the region Asia,  argues Roberts.  He states that  because of 
China’s emergence as a pole and nuclear power and because strategic modernisation could have 
spillover effects, the nuclear future will for a great part be written in Asia.59
In December 1983, China applied to be a member of the IAEA and with that became a 
member of the non-proliferation regime. It was an significant step, as it was the first time that China 
accepted an international regime including safeguards and inspections. At the moment, China was 
still  opening  up  to  the  outside  world.  Before  joining  the  non-proliferation  regime,  Chinese 60
president Mao’s revolutionary theories shaped Chinese foreign policy.  China criticised the non-
proliferation regime as being discriminatory and a play for the, then, superpowers to maintain a 
nuclear  weapons  monopoly.  After  Mao’s  successor  Deng Xiaoping installed  a  comprehensive 61
economic modernization program, China’s foreign policy changed and, while still criticising the 
NPT, started to support NPT goals and objectives. From a practical point of view, joining the non-
proliferation regime was a high-payoff decision with low costs for China. As a NWS, China could 
take a seat on the Board of Directors and collect substantial benefits, without having to submit to 
intrusive inspections of the IAEA.  However, shortly after joining the IAEA, China proposed an 62
agreement  of  ‘voluntary’  IAEA  safeguards.  This  meant  that  China  would  permit  periodic 
inspections to ensure that no nuclear material could unaccountably disappear from its facilities.  63
This effort indicated much symbolic support from China to the non-proliferation regime. Over time, 
China’s role and influence in the non-proliferation regime has expanded.  At first,  China held a 
relatively low profile during NPT Revcons and Prepcoms, what supposedly was because Chinese 
officials were still learning about the non-proliferation regime.64
Yan Xuetong in his article compares China and the United States with regards of being 
global powers and names two key factors that determine this: comparative strengths of a state and 
its strategic relationships. When these factors are compared, it shows that despite China’s immense 
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growth, it  is still  behind Washington with regards to a unipolar position.  As a reaction to the 65
American  view of  Washington  being  a  hegemonic  power,  China  and  Russia  share  a  common 
interest in strategic partnership, in order to counterbalance the United States. In joint statements of 
the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers,  the two countries  have approved multipolarity  as  a 
desirable feature of the emerging world order. This was also because it signals their independence 
from the dominating view of the United States.66
However,  the  U.S.  has  criticised  China  multiple  times  on its  compliance  with  the  non-
proliferation regime. According to the most recent National Defense Strategy (2018), Washington 
sees  China as  a  strategic  competitor  instead of  strategic  partner.  The NPR does  indicate  that 67
Washington does not want to regard China (and Russia) as adversaries, and seeks stable relations. 
According to Wendy Frieman, U.S. declarations on China during the last years have said more 
about the limitations of the non-proliferation regime, than about Chinese compliance. In her book, 
she stated: “It was the shortcomings of the NPT and related organizations that caused the United 
States to reinterpret them and to create a regulatory system well beyond what had been accepted 
internationally.”  This indicates how the growing importance of China has influenced American 68
(unipolar) behaviour in the nuclear realm. Taking this thought even further, as a result of the 2015 
NPT review conference not coming to a multi-lateral agreement, Washington was denounced as one 
of  the  three  countries  most  responsible  for  the  failure  of  strengthening  the  NPT and  the  non-
proliferation  regime  (the  other  two  countries  being  Iran  and  Egypt).  This  could  be  seen  as 69
representing a low point for U.S. leadership and its role as regime-enforcer in the non-proliferation 
regime.
2.2 Conclusion
The transition from a bipolar- to multipolar power system since the Cold War has been an important 
influence on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the strain that the non-proliferation regime 
encounters at the moment. It is claimed that the non-proliferation regime, and the NPT specifically, 
needs  multilateral  consensus  in  order  for  it  to  work.  The lack  of  consensus  as  a  result  of  the 
changing global power balance accounts for erosion of the non-proliferation regime. The collapse of 
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the Soviet Union and the hegemonic position of Washington are likely to have contributed to the 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  because  of  the  subsequent  diminishing  nuclear  umbrella,  i.e. 
accounting  for  insecurities  in  state’s  threat  environments,  and  the  unpredictability  surrounding 
Washington’s behaviour on enforcing the global non-proliferation regime. It  can be argued that 
Washington’s hegemonic behavior  especially also accounted for  the current  lack of  multilateral 
consensus and recalcitrant position of increasingly more states in the non-proliferation regime. As 
the previous chapter also concluded, and is reinforced by this chapter, the non-proliferation regime 
needs to work on the image of the main enforcers of the regime, the NWS.  This accounts especially 
for the U.S., who since the start of the non-proliferation regime has been one of the main enforcers 
and until now, despite its declining position, still possess most experience, knowledge, power and 
leverage  to  enforce  the  rules.  Current  trends  in  nuclear  proliferation  scholarship  point  towards 
proliferation pessimism in a multipolar world, so there is a high need for someone and/or something 
that better controls proliferation in the current global system.  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Chapter 3 
Nuclear latency in a Multipolar World 
This chapter explains why it is important to understand nuclear latency with regards to the non-
proliferation regime functioning in a multipolar world, and how nuclear latency relates to nuclear 
proliferation. In the end, nuclear latency is introduced as a tool to better understand the current 
nuclear (non-)proliferation environment and to make decisions on how the non-proliferation regime 
could be adapted to the current world status. There is a chance that nuclear latency causes many 
states to acquire nuclear weapons within a short amount of time, which is a great change since 
nuclear proliferation used to be in a slow incremental pace.  Also, nuclear latency could become 70
increasingly  more  common because  of  the  rising  need  of  nuclear  power  in  the  global  energy 
equation, especially in Asia. This chapter indicates that in the current global system it is very hard 
to prevent the spread of nuclear technology, and thus indirectly nuclear latency. By recognizing 
nuclear latency, the non-proliferation regime would adapt to the current global situation and work 
towards  decreasing the grey area that  exists  as  a  result  of  the  dual-use possibilities  of  nuclear 
technology.
3.1 The rising role of nuclear power
It is useful to look into the global energy demand and -options, in order to conclude to what extent 
peaceful  purposes  of  nuclear  energy  are  necessary,  or  whether  other/better  alternatives  exist. 
Growth in the global population and global economy, and rapid urbanisation are three of the main 
reasons that during the last years, and during the years to come, a substantial increase in global 
energy  demand  exists.  Currently,  nuclear  energy  is  an  important  part  of  the  global  energy 71
equation, which provides energy security and global economic development.  It has high power 72
supply capacities  and requires  low fuel  levels  for  operation.  Nuclear  energy is  seen as  a  great 
opportunity  for  decarbonization  of  the  global  economies  because  nuclear  technology is  a  low-
carbon technology. In 2013, it provided 11% of the global electricity.  At the moment, development 73
of alternative energy technologies are necessary because the world still depends heavily on fossil 
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fuels, namely about 50% of the global energy supply. Comparing to other alternative fuels, think of 
for example solar power, hydroelectric power or wind power, the great advantage of nuclear power 
is that it is independent from the environment. Bluntly speaking, if wind does not optimally blow, or 
the sun does not optimally shine, production is limited. Nuclear power is not constrained by nature 
in that way. Also, not the least argument that can be brought to the table is that nuclear energy is 
relatively cheap in costs.74
However, of course, there are very clear downsides associated with development of nuclear 
energy, like safety issues and radioactive waste. Despite standard safety concerns, history shows 
that accidents could still happen. Think of the events in Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. 
Also, nuclear waste, although heavily regulated and managed by the IEAE,  is hard to store entirely 
safe  and  permanent  (high-level  radioactive  waste  can  remain  dangerous  for  hundred  thousand 
years). Next to that, in the book Learning From Fukushima, where several experts in their own 
fields have researched to what extent nuclear power is a realistic option for Asia, conclusions are 
made that state that the economics of energy point to a declining future for nuclear power. So, 
although maybe an attractive option now, in the future more arguments for other fuels and against 
nuclear power will rise.75
Despite the very high risks that come with nuclear technology, many official rapports and 
statistics indicate that at the moment, nuclear energy brings great advantages for the world that 
could much lighten the pressure on the planet itself. Especially in Central- and East-Asia, nuclear 
energy accounts  for  an increasingly greater  part  of  the energy equation.  It  is  expected that  the 
nuclear energy amounts will increase the most in Asia, namely 3,5 times by 2050.  The energy 76
demands there are increasing heavily because of, for example, rapid urbanisation since more people 
will be relying on commercial energy. So, since peaceful purposes of nuclear energy do provide 
crucial benefits comparing to fossils fuels, it is an alternative fuel that at the moment cannot really 
be denied to states. Concerning alternative fuels, it is an attractive option for many states, and the 
non-proliferation regime should take in account that it is highly probable that nuclear technology 
development will be an increasingly common condition that states adopt, in spite of the risks.
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3.2 Nuclear latency in a multipolar world
As mentioned before, nuclear latency is not something new. For years, states that have had the 
latent  capacity  to  produce  nuclear  weapons  have  existed.  However,  in  a  time  that  the  non-
proliferation  regime needs  changes  because  it  is  under  strain,  it  is  useful  to  take  a  change  of 
perspective and not solely focus on nuclear weapons effects, but also on the effects of what happens 
before nuclear weapons are actually acquired. In order to find out how the non-proliferation regime 
could better be adapted to fit the current circumstances, it is important to look into the causes and 
effects of nuclear latency. According to Scott Sagan, the nuclear latency question (how quickly can 
states develop nuclear weapons from any given nuclear-expertise level?) is becoming exceedingly 
important because the answers can help analyse nuclear policy issues.  The case studies in the next 77
chapter  will  analyse how nuclear  latency is  being handled,  but  first  this  chapter  looks at  what 
nuclear latency entails and suggests how the concept could be used as a basis for adapting the 
current non-proliferation regime.
Most studies on nuclear proliferation focus on the (deterrence) effects of nuclear weapons. 
However what is relatively new is the idea that political effects also occur when states possess only 
the latent capability, but not the weapons. Nuclear latency means possessing the technical capability 
to produce nuclear weapons, but not doing so. Relatively little research has been done into figuring 
out the effects of latent nuclear capabilities.  There exists two large groups of research into how 78
quickly states can produce nuclear weapons if  they possess nuclear latent  capabilities and how 
likely they are to do so: political science approaches and scientific approaches. According to Scott 
Sagan, one of the main problems with researching nuclear latency remains that political science 
studies and scientific studies do not take into account both of these sides of nuclear technology 
enough. He argues that the political side, as well as the technological side of nuclear technology 
influence nuclear latency, but that most studies only look at the issue from one of those sides.  The 79
Bulletin of  the Atomic Scientists  also recognises these two classes of  research,  but  argues that 
latency should be approached as being the product of technical capability (having ENR facilities or 
not) and intent.  The Bulletin argues that the factor “intent” is of most importance because it would 80
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indicate the amount of threat that a, potential, nuclear latent state possesses. This classification of 
nuclear latency indicates one of the biggest issues of the current non-proliferation regime, namely 
how do you control, or influence, ‘intent’?
During the last decade, several studies have been conducted on nuclear latency. However, 
the assessments of nuclear latency in those studies varied widely. One of the largest and most recent 
studies on nuclear latency is the nuclear latency dataset from Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin 
Tkach.  Their dataset focusses on the development of ENR facilities, which is widely regarded as 81
the most important feature of nuclear latency.  According to their data, between 1939 and 2012, 31 82
countries  acquired  latent  nuclear  capabilities,  which  makes  nuclear  latency  three  times  more 
common than nuclear proliferation. On a more political level, nuclear latency derives in part from 
states that abandoned their weapon programs, but are expected to have kept their expertise. Brad 
Roberts argues that at least some of the existing latent capabilities are in part motivated to be a 
hedge against a possible future collapse of the security environment.  It also derives from the rising 
role of nuclear power in the global energy equation and from the generally rising skill-levels in 
developing states.83
The first chapter concluded that many scholars agree that security arguments play a great 
role in nuclear non-proliferation. Also, the second chapter indicated how since 1991 there exists a 
very different power order than during the Cold War.  How then does nuclear latency fit in the 
current non-proliferation regime? Many studies indicate that nuclear latency could serve as virtual 
deterrent  and bargaining chip.  Rural  N. Mehta and Rachel  Elizabeth Whitlark in their  research 
conclude  that  latency  invites  coercion  (forceful  persuasion),  without  producing  deterrence.  84
Matthew Fuhrmann argued in his article that latent nuclear powers can deter aggression, without 
actually possessing assembled warheads.  Also, Fuhrmann and Tkach, on the basis of their dataset, 85
argue that  nuclear latency reduces the likelihood of being targeted in militarized disputes.  This 
means that, according to these researchers, nuclear latency provides deterrence benefits.  86
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So if states have latent nuclear capabilities, how likely are they to proceed to producing 
nuclear weapons? Coming back to the idea that nuclear latency should be approached by looking at 
the factor  intent,  Mattiacci  and Jones indicate  that  the process  of  nuclear  proliferation is  often 
nonlinear: only rarely do states proceed directly to producing nuclear weapons after establishing a 
nuclear program. Their research found that higher levels of nuclear latency facilitate the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, but also facilitate reversal to the state of no nuclear weapon program because a 
state has then acquired the ability to quickly reestablish a nuclear program.  Their conclusions are 87
supported by Fuhrmann and Tkach’s dataset on nuclear latency. They show that between 1939 and 
2012,  of the 31 states that acquired the latent capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, only ten 
percent of these states went on to acquire nuclear weapons.88
George Perkovich and James M. Acton wrote a book in which they discuss the abolition of 
nuclear weapons. They recognise a belief among many scholars that it would be impossible to better 
control nuclear proliferation without serious progress towards nuclear disarmament. They argue that 
because of the fact that the NWS don’t show enough efforts to disarm, the NNWS are reluctant to 
strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) system of safeguards.  This second 89
step, strengthening the IAEA system of safeguards, is by many scholars seen as one of the options 
that is necessary to better control the period between starting a nuclear program and producing 
nuclear weapons. However, Perkovich and Acton also argue that, even when NWS would disarm 
completely, nuclear hedging would be inevitable. Nuclear hedging is “the retention of a capability 
to reverse the renunciation of  nuclear  weapons”.  In their  book,  they discuss several  hedging-90
scenarios that illustrate how NWS could handle giving up their nuclear weapons, but still keep the 
option of somehow develop of use nuclear weapons provided it be necessary. When thinking of 
ways to adapt the non-proliferation regime, the factor nuclear hedging should be taken into account. 
The probable presence of nuclear hedging as a result of disarmament, which is related to nuclear 
latency, should therefor also be taken into account. Perkovich and Acton illustrate that in the current 
situation, disarmament will not directly solve the roots of the strains that the regime is facing, which 
brings us back to the need to better control nuclear latency.
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3.3 Conclusion
Nuclear latency means to have the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons, but not to 
do so. Discussing nuclear latency provides a better insight in the influence of nuclear technology on 
the  global  power  system.  Not  only  possessing  nuclear  weapons  accounts  for  reactions  of  the 
international  environment,  also  just  possessing  dual-use  nuclear  technology  will  do  that.  So 
basically, the non-proliferation regime needs not only to manage nuclear weapons, but also nuclear 
knowledge. The latter has not, as was established in the first chapter, received much attention during 
the first years of the non-proliferation regime because most attention went out to non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. Since dual-use technology is the threshold that most nuclear-inclined states are 
on nowadays,  it  is  needed that  the  non-proliferation regime takes  that  part  of  the  process  into 
account more. Nuclear energy is becoming increasingly important in the global energy equation, so 
states have all the more reason to develop their nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes. Since 
nuclear power is currently an important alternative fuel, many states could acquire nuclear latency 
since the civilian and military purposes of nuclear power lie so close to each other.
The most important issue on nuclear latency that currently arises is that, in combination with 
the current global system, in the future it could bring a whole new form of nuclear proliferation. 
Instead of the slow incremental addition, or subtraction, of nuclear weapon states, the spread of 
latent  capabilities  could  create  a  ‘wildfire-like’  proliferation  as  states  work  to  turn  nuclear 
technology into nuclear weapons when some kind of catalytic event occurs. Then, instead of having 
nine states that posses nuclear weapons, in a relatively short time, there could be approximately 31 
states  that  posses  these  weapons.  Perkovich and Acton illustrate  that  in  the  current  situation, 91
disarmament will not directly solve the roots of the strains that the regime is facing, which brings us 
back to the need to better control the grey area within nuclear latency.  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Chapter 4
Japan and Nuclear Latency
The former chapters focussed on showing that the current regime is experiencing strains because it 
is not adequately adapted to the current global situation, the change from a bi- to multipolar global 
system being one of the main reasons for this. These chapters illustrated how this development in 
the global system accounts for great changes in the security environments of many states, which is 
one of the crucial determinants of nuclear proliferation. However, neither the NPT, nor other arms 
control treaties directly address nuclear latency. This, while in the current (unstable) global situation 
there may be an increasing chance of states wanting nuclear weapons, and first acquiring a nuclear 
latent  status  is  the  most  favourable  road.  When  discussing  (non-)proliferation  matters,  nuclear 
latency can be either positive or negative (think of proliferation optimism and -pessimism), but 
either way complicates the objective.  92
The last chapters of this thesis conduct three case studies. These case studies are on states 
that are part to the NPT and all possess dual-use technology, but do not possess nuclear weapons 
(that the world knows of). The case studies are on Japan, Iran and South-Korea. Iran has been, and 
still is, one of the most contentious cases for the non-proliferation regime to handle and highlights 
where the loopholes in the non-proliferation regime are. The cases of Japan and South-Korea are 
discussed because of the rising importance of East-Asia in terms of nuclear-related developments, 
like the rise in nuclear power in the energy equation, and the current regional instability in Asia. 
These case studies serve the purpose of indicating the motivations for these three states to acquire 
latent nuclear capabilities, showing how the non-proliferation regime has thus far handled nuclear 
latency in these cases. It also serves as a way to comment on what solutions the non-proliferation 
regime could incorporate in order to take in account nuclear latency and adapt to the current world 
situation.
4.1 The Japan option
Nuclear latency is sometimes also called ‘the Japan option’.  The case of Japan’s latent nuclear 
status is a useful illustration of how a state’s identity in world politics can shape the development of 
nuclear latency.  In principle, Japan has established several legal and institutional mechanisms that 93
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prohibit Japan from becoming a nuclear power, but this state seems to keep a nuclear option open.  94
This  casestudy  discusses  Japan’s  nuclear  history,  security  environment  and  relations  with  the 
regime.
The scholarly literature that describes which way Japan is expected to go with regards to 
developing  nuclear  weapons  can  be  divided  in  two  classes.  The  first  class  stresses  a  strong 
probability that Japan will want to match its great economic power with military power. The second 
class argues that because of Japan’s history, being the only state to have ever encountered nuclear 
attacks, nuclear options are non-options. Both positions are understandable if one looks at Japan’s 
history  and  current  security  concerns.  However,  this  unique  position  in  the  non-proliferation 95
regime has made its non-nuclear weapons policy since 1945 seem very contradictory: Japan was 
attacked  by  Washington’s  nuclear  weapons,  but  is  also  protected  by  Washington’s  extended 
deterrence;  Japan is  protected by extended deterrence,  but  supports  the abolition of  all  nuclear 
weapons; and although most states have abandoned the use of plutonium for civilian purposes, 
Japan has become the leading proponent of such programs, despite multiple accidents.  Experts 96
believe that Japan can produce enough supergrade plutonium (purer than weapon-grade plutonium) 
in ten years to build approximately seventy nuclear weapons. Only small quantities of supergrade 
plutonium are necessary in lightweight, highly accurate, nuclear weapons. Some experts believe 
that Japan already possesses some means of delivering nuclear warheads.97
4.2 History of Japan’s nuclear development 
Japan showed its ambitions to possess nuclear weapons for the first  time during World War II. 
According to declassified U.S. army documents, Japan conducted an atomic bomb project during 
WWII. However, most of the facilities that were used, were for the most part destroyed during U.S. 
air  raids  on  Japanese  cities.  Also,  shortly  before  the  Soviet  Union  entered  Japan  in  1945,  the 
Japanese army destroyed unfinished atomic bombs and secret papers.  However, quickly during the 98
postwar period, the Japanese public opinion became highly anti-nuclear.  By 1945, the Japanese 
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people had experienced atomic warfare, as well as radioactive contamination consequences from 
U.S. nuclear bomb tests in Bikini Atoll, also known as the Lucky Dragon incident.  99
During the premiership of Eisaku Satō,  Japan’s concerns with nuclear weapons emerged 
again  during  the  later  postwar  period.  Between  1968  and  1970,  a  panel  of  academic  experts 
appointed by Satō created two rapports on the possibility of creating an independent nuclear force. 
The rapports concluded that it was possible to develop a small number of plutonium atomic bombs, 
but  that  those productions  would have great  consequences  for  Japan that  would diplomatically 
isolate the state from alarmed neighbouring countries. Despite the anti-nuclear stance of the public, 
conservative Japanese leaders have pushed against these negative feelings and argue that Japan 
should develop nuclear power, or perhaps even -weapons.  In January 1968 Satō formulated what 100
has come to be regarded as the four principles of Japan’s nuclear policy, namely: “to develop atomic 
energy solely for peaceful purposes;  to promote nuclear disarmament around the world;  to refrain 
from possessing, producing, or bringing nuclear weapons into Japan; and to rely on the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella for deterrence against all forms of nuclear attacks. ”101
Around and during the 1970s, Japan’s nuclear program has been largely constrained by the 
United  States.  The  first  bilateral  nuclear  agreement,  the  U.S.-Japan  Atomic  Energy  Agreement 
(UJAEA), was concluded in 1958. With this agreement,  Washington intended to secure Japan’s 
compliance with the American non-proliferation policies. The agreement entailed for example all 
uranium enrichment services to be provided by the U.S. government, which accounted for a virtual 
U.S.  monopoly  control  over  the  non-Communist  enrichment  market  until  the  early  1970’s.  On 
November 4th 1987,  after  five years of  negotiations,  Japan and the U.S.  signed a new nuclear 
agreement that replaced the old one. It provided Japan with a thirty-year ‘blanket permit' to ship 
U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel to a third country for reprocessing, eliminating the requirement for prior 
U.S. approval.’102
In 1970 Japan signed the NPT, but it was only in 1976 that Japan ratified the treaty. Japan 
was reluctant to join the NPT as a NNWS because of the discriminatory nature of the treaty and 
limited debate over the future of Japan’s ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. Because this state 
does not possess fossils fuels resources, securing the possibility to produce nuclear energy has had a 
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high priority in Tokyo. Japan would only sign the treaty when the U.S. promised not to interfere 
with Tokyo’s pursuit for reprocessing capabilities for civilian purposes.103
International controversy surrounding Japan’s nuclear development started during the early 
1990s.  The controversy followed after statements made by senior Japanese politicians who stated 104
that Japan is (still) not willing to give up the right to pursue nuclear weapons.  In the examples 105
and statements that international security specialist Hahnkyu Park mentions in his article, regional 
tensions with the nuclear development of North Korea and insecurity about the extent of the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella were the main motivators for this change in attitude towards nuclear weapons.  106
Throughout  its  nuclear  history,  Japan  has  had  a  relatively  easy  relationship  with  the  non-
proliferation regime, despite its advanced ENR capabilities; however, it was the open change of 
attitude towards nuclear weapons that changed that easy relationship with the regime enforcers.
4.3 Japan and the non-proliferation regime
As can be concluded from Japan’s nuclear history, Japan’s position on nuclear weapons is that it is a 
political choice not to possess nuclear weapons, mainly due to domestic constraints,  but that if 
future  international  circumstances  dictate  to  do so Japan could seek a  nuclear  option.  These 107
domestic  constraints,  in  the  form  of  anti-militarism  and  anti-nuclear  sentiment,  are  strongly 
embedded in the Japanese mind and Japanese social, legal and state institutions.  However, Park 108
argues that a resurgence of ultra-nationalism in Japanese society may provide a condition in which 
Japan would try to qo nuclear.  This illustrates that this state is still deeply divided on the nuclear 109
matter. Even when looking at such international issues as nuclear proliferation, as the first chapter 
described,  domestic  factors  can  play  a  crucial  role  in  nuclear  (non-)proliferation  behavior,  and 
should always be taken into account. 
Two international relations are very important with regards to Japan’s position in the non-
proliferation regime: the U.S.-Japanese relation and the Sino-Japanese relation. The central pillar of 
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Japan’s  posture  on  nuclear  (non-)proliferation  has  been  the  U.S.’s  extended  nuclear  deterrence 
(END).  Japan is less likely to pursue an independent nuclear capability, because it relies on the 110
American nuclear umbrella. However, recent events concerning North-Korea seem to have caused 
strains on this relationship. Experts argue that Japan has been feeling left in the cold, when during 
2018  U.S.  President  Donald  Trump  decided  to  solely  approach  North-Korea,  instead  of  the 
longstanding agreement of ‘speaking with a united voice, together with South-Korea. Trump made 
this  decision without  consulting with  Japan.  The Sino-Japanese  relation is  also  an important 111
influence on Japanese nuclear behavior. For years, Sino-Japanese relations have been subject to 
many unresolved issues, because of Japan’s imperial past.  Currently, with regards to the possible 112
nuclear option that Japan has, China is concerned about Japan’s possible and sudden emergence 
from a state of advanced latency. China believes that the U.S. is assisting Japan, under the cover of 
END, in developing such a breakout capability.
With regards to enforcing the regime, Japan strives to be a leader in non—proliferation- and 
disarmament efforts.  Because of  its  history of  being the only state  to have ever  encountered a 
nuclear  attack,  combined with its  highly developed technology and substantial  economy,  Japan 
holds a unique position to promote disarmament and non-proliferation. Among other things, this 
state  has been supporting the NPT strongly and working hard towards strengthening the IAEA 
safeguards  system  by,  among  other  things,  advocating  for  universalisation  of  the  Additional 
Protocols, mentioned during the first chapter, which increase the IAEA’s ability to verify peaceful 
uses of nuclear material in states with comprehensive safeguard agreements.113114
4.4 Conclusion
To conclude, Japan has a long and complicated nuclear history: being a powerful global player and 
the only state to have ever encountered a nuclear attack, this state in theory has many arguments 
for- and against  producing nuclear weapons.  Due to its  advanced reprocessing- and enrichment 
capabilities, the Japanese case of nuclear latency is the most pronounced case in Northeast Asia. 
 Fintan Hoey, “Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation,” 485.110
 Richard Katz, “Trump and Japan,” Foreign Affairs, February 16, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/111
articles/japan/2017-02-16/trump-and-japan.
 Brad Roberts, Nuclear Multipolarity and Stability, 32.112
 Masoko Toki, “Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation, Japan’s Role in the NPT,” Nuclear Threat 113
Initiative, December 1, 2005. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/sixty-years-after-nuclear-devastation-
japan/.
 “Additional Protocol,” International Atomic Energy Agency, Accessed June 18, 2018. http://www.un.org/114
en/conf/npt/2015/.
 34
Currently, states in this part of the world, Japan included, encounter great strategic insecurity as a 
result of the changing regional and global power balance, i.e. the degrading position of the U.S., and 
rising  superpower  China  as  a  neighbour,  as  discussed  in  the  second  chapter.  Also  the  nuclear 
development  of  North  Korea  is  accounting  for  security  instability.  These  insecurities  influence 
Japan’s nuclear behavior, and therefor the strained relations with the non-proliferation regime since 
the 1990s. 
On the one hand Japan currently strives to be one of the leaders within the non-proliferation 
regime by extensively working towards disarmament  and non-proliferation.  On the other  hand, 
despite complying with the international  regulations,  Japan still  accounts for  a very ambiguous 
nuclear policy. This is because of the dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the immense 
quantities of excess plutonium that  Tokyo possesses.  Although not going against  the rules,  this 
dependence and plutonium stockpiles do compromise Japan’s supportive position on disarmament 
and non-proliferation. With regards to the question that this thesis poses, whether nuclear latency 
provides a basis for adapting the non-proliferation regime, a “yes” can be reasoned from the Japan 
case. Japan shows strong support of non-proliferation and the Additional Protocol, which arguably 
accounts for the dubious side of its nuclear policies to fall in the background and be more or less 
accepted.  Japan  is  in  a  position  of  acknowledging  how important  civilian  purposes  of  nuclear 
energy can be, and in principle is repulsed by nuclear weapons. Its solution, which for a great part 
accounts for the accepting position of the main regime enforcers towards Japan, is transparency 
during the whole process of a nuclear program, which makes the Additional Protocols of the IAEA 
all the more important now.  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Chapter 5
Iran and Nuclear Latency
At the moment, and already for years, the nuclear development of Iran has been one of the most 
contentious cases that the non-proliferation regime is trying to handle. It is regarded as one of the 
greatest test-cases for the non-proliferation regime and its cornerstone, the NPT.  Iran is seen as 115
constantly  trying  to  test  and  outmanoeuvre  the  regime  by  using  its  Article  IV-right  to  have  a 
peaceful nuclear programme. Iran has insisted repeatedly that it wishes to be treated the same as 
Japan with regards to its NPT-approved civilian uranium-enrichment program.  However, Iran’s 116
nuclear intent is much open for discussion: although there is no conclusive evidence that Iran is 
working towards  weaponization,  there  are  a  number  of  indications  and activities  that  could be 
related to Iran’s program is advancing in a direction towards producing nuclear weapons.  Its ties 117
with the A.Q. Khan Network is one of the reasons for these doubts on Iran’s intent.  This case 118
study discusses Iran’s nuclear history and Iran’s security environment that could influence Tehran’s 
nuclear behavior and its relations with the non-proliferation regime. This case study will also focus 
on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran Deal, in order to see to what 
extent this modern addition to the regime handles nuclear latency. Washington’s decision of May 
2018 to step out of the Iran-deal marks an important point during the life of the non-proliferation 
regime.  All  in  all,  this  case  study  aims  to  add  to  the  conclusions  of  this  thesis  that  the  non-
proliferation regime should add more importance to recognising nuclear latency, and to researching 
how nuclear latency can be or should be handled.
5.1 Iranian nuclear history 
In 2002, public revelations for the first time exposed Iran’s secret nuclear program. However, the 
U.S.  had  suspicions  about  Iran’s  nuclear  intent  already  well  before  that  time.  The  Carter 
administration  feared  that  the  Shah  of  Iran  sought  to  produce  nuclear  weapons,  after  certain 
comments of the Shah indicated an interest in acquiring a nuclear bomb.  Also the mullahs, who 119
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assumed power after the Shah, were thinking about their nuclear options, as was later indicated by 
memoirs of Iran’s current president Hassan Rouhani. 
During the 1990s, Iran became frustrated in its pursuit of nuclear cooperation with the West, 
and attempted to cooperate with China and Russia. China helped Iran build the Esfahan uranium 
conversion facility  and provided much uranium to Iran during 1991. During 1995, Russia agreed to 
complete the Bushehr nuclear power reactor. However, in its efforts to deny Iran access to nuclear 
technology, the U.S. took much time to discourage China and Russia to cooperate with Iran. By the 
late 1990s, U.S. pressure caused China to weaken its nuclear cooperation with Iran, and Russia also 
caved under U.S. pressure. However, the U.S. was surprised by Iran’s relations since the late 1980s 
with the A.Q. Kahn Network, who provided Tehran with critical uranium enrichment technology 
and components.  120
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group made claims of the secret nuclear facilities in 
central Iran. After the cover on these facilities was blown, Iranian officials officially notified the 
IAEA. It was not until February 2003 that inspectors were granted access in these facilities and in 
November of that year, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that Iran had committed “failures 
and  breaches  of  its  obligations  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  its  Safeguard  Agreement.”  121
During the fall,  Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei called upon then-Secretary of Iran’s National 
Security  Council  Hassan  Rouhani  to  be  the  regime’s  nuclear  trouble  shooter.  He  focussed  on 
internal- and external aspects: calming the concerns of the international environment that Iran was 
seeking nuclear  weapons,  and internally securing authority over  the regime’s nuclear  activities. 
Rouhani found international support  in Europe and with the IAEA Director General  ElBaradei. 
Elbaradei opposed the American invasion of Iraq and feared that Washington would organise a war 
against Iran next.122
In October 2003, Rouhani negotiated a deal with the EU-3 (i.e. Germany, France and the 
UK. This deal meant for Iran to suspend its enrichment activities and adopt transparency measures. 
In return, the EU-3 would use their influence to normalise Iran’s nuclear activities and Teheran 
would not be referred to the UN Security Council and be sanctioned. However, the suspension-
promises were not durable, because Iran used ambiguities in the deal to continue its enrichment 
program. This reactivation of the enrichment program accounted for great international criticism: in 
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the beginning of 2006 Iran was reported to the U.S. Security Council.  In December 2006, the 123
Security Council launched the first sanctions against Iran.
After these sanctions, Iran embarked upon a policy of nuclear defiance, in particular the 
centrifuge program witnessed great expansion. However, in order to balance this nuclear rebellion, 
Iran kept showing willingness to continue diplomatic discussions with the international community. 
The  incoming Obama administration  changed its  diplomatic  stance  in  comparison  to  the  Bush 
administration,  by  pursuing  diplomatic  settlement  instead  of  first  insisting  that  Iran  resumed 
suspension of  its  enrichment  program. During Iranian elections  in  2013 an dissatisfaction with 
Iran’s  rebellious  nuclear  behavior  showed among elites,  especially  as  the  U.N.  sanctions  were 
hitting Iran’s economy hard. Rouhani took office in 2013, and made back-channel negotiations with 
U.S. officials in order to begin frame a new deal.  On November 24 2013, a Joint Comprehensive 124
Plan Of Action, known as the JCPOA or the Iran-deal, was agreed on between Iran and the P5+1 
(the U.N. Security Council members plus Germany).
5.2 Iran and the non-proliferation regime
How is Iran’s position in the non-proliferation regime with regards to its relations with the regime 
enforcers and its security situation? Iran is a dominant state in the Middle-East and also the largest 
country in the region with the capacity to pursue an international agenda. However, its potential 
remains  underdeveloped  because  of  years  of  international  sanctions.  During  the  last  years, 125
following the JCPOA, Iran has been submitting its  nuclear  plants  to  safety checks and greater 
transparency in its nuclear program.  However, the deal has had a mixed impact on Iran’s regional 126
relations since Tehran argues it tries to mend the divide between Iran and its neighbours, but also 
does  not  stop  working  with  dual-use  nuclear  technology.  Iran  has  been  unapologetic  and 127
dismissive  for  all  documented  safeguard  violations  and  pieces  of  evidence  regarding  nuclear 
weapon intent. Teheran maintains that it was the inability to buy peaceful-purpose technology, as 
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allowed by Article IV, on the open market that drove the regime to clandestine acquisition of these 
technologies.128
The JCPOA was a major breakthrough in Iran’s nuclear history. The Iran Deal contains a 
number of IAEA safeguards-related measures that have expanded the IAEA’s authority in Iran.  It 129
includes allowing the IAEA to monitor Iran’s uranium mines and mills, centrifuge components and 
heavy-water plant. It also aims to prohibit Iran from engaging in dual-use activities by enlisting 
extra activities that Iran is not to engage in, like designing and acquiring nuclear explosive devices, 
detonation  systems,  diagnostic  systems  or  explosively  driven  neutron  sources.  Most  non-130
proliferation- and Iran experts found the deal to be surprisingly good because it could change the 
course of Iran’s nuclear program and simultaneously change Iran’s relations with other states. In 
February 2014, high-level talks among the P5+1 and Iran resumed in order to aim for a long-term 
agreement.  However,  great  divisions  remained,  among  other  things  on  the  constraints  on  the 
centrifuge program, and on the military dimensions of the nuclear program.131
According to statements from the Iranian regime, it was the constant threat of (security) 
attacks from Israel  and the United States  that  in  2002 accounted for  building the underground 
Natanz facility.  At the moment, the situation is not very different than in 2002. The amount of 132
threats from Israel towards Iran not to produce nuclear weapons is still high, and Europe has reacted 
with great fury on the decision from May 2018 of Trump to step out of the JCPOA, after stating that 
this deal should have never been made.  According to most opponents of the Iran Deal, including 133
president Trump, the main breaking points of the JCPOA are connected to the ‘sunset provisions’ of 
the deal: clauses that indicate when various imposed restrictions expire. Critics argue not only that 
the  expiration  dates  arrive  too  soon,  but  that  there  are  expiration  dates  at  all.  According  to 134
transatlantic  diplomacy-expert  Jeremy Shapiro,  the  U.S.  stepping  out  of  the  Iran-deal  shows  a 
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American  disregard  for  transatlantic  alliances  and  indicates  that  any  act  of  U.S.  disruption  is 
possible.  135
In  response to  the  withdrawal,  Rouhani  announced that  Iran remains  in  the  deal,  íf  the 
remaining parties find a satisfactory solution to the safeguards and economic benefits that fall under 
the deal (which the U.S. will disregard when it is not a party to the deal anymore).  As a reaction 136
to  the  U.S.’s  hostile  behavior  towards  the  JCPOA and  Iran,  Iran’s  Supreme Leader  Khamenei 
declared that preferring East to West is among the top priorities for Iran’s foreign policy. In this 
regard, Iran has also signed trade- and cooperation agreements with Russia and China. In other 
words, Washington’s behaviour is pushing Iran towards the U.S.’s rivals.  It is plausible to assume 137
that Trump’s decision to offset Obama’s foreign policy efforts of engagement is a big step in the 
wrong direction when Washington’s credibility has already been at stake for a while. Although the 
European Union is working hard in trying to compensate for Washington's exit from the deal, Iran 
believes that their efforts do not yet compensate enough.138
5.3 Conclusion 
The case of Iran’s nuclear development can be seen as depicting the voice of many annoyed NNWS 
that feel discriminated by the current non-proliferation regime. Iran found loopholes in the NPT: the 
regime possesses nuclear fuel-capabilities, as is allowed according to article IV of the NPT, that can 
also within a short amount of time be used to produce weapon-grade material. The case of Iran is 
finding merit in exposing U.S. hypocrisy on nuclear issues by means of exploiting loopholes like 
these  in  the  U.S.-dominated  non-proliferation  regime.  This  route  to  weaponisation  is  seen  as 
attractive because of the self-contradictions within the U.S.-led non-proliferation regime.  This 139
chapter indicated how the NPT leaves room for states, Iran being the leading example, to develop 
dual-use technology that can be used for nuclear weapons. This problem that is indicated by the 
case of Iran, has so far been solved to a great extent by means of the JCPOA, which imposed extra 
restrictions in order to decrease the possibility of producing dual-use technologies to a minimum.
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It  is  unclear  to  what  extent  the JCPOA’s measures could add to the broader-  and more 
universal  set  of  rules  that  is  contained  by  the  IAEA.  In  his  article  on  this  question,  non-140
proliferation expert Paul Kerr expects it is unlikely that these agreements will be added to the day-
to-day implementations of the IAEA. This is because the case of Iran has been a fairly exceptional 
case in amount of concerns that this NPT-member generates. Also, the general efficacy of the non-
proliferation regime has already been improving because, among other things, more and more states 
adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol. Kerr, however, does believe that the JCPOA has provided tools 
that may prove useful for the future, either for routine matters or for extraordinary circumstances.  141
In any case,  the JCPOA indicated that  the non-proliferation regime is  trying to handle nuclear 
latency, but has not yet found a broader solution that fits all the nuclear latent cases.  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Chapter 6
South Korea and Nuclear Latency 
After discussing Japan and Iran, this final case study looks at South Korea as a nuclear latent state. 
It  discusses South Korea’s nuclear history, security environment,  and how the regime enforcers 
have handled South Korea as a nuclear latent case up until now. All in order to add to the earlier 
thoughts on how the non-proliferation regime should adapt to current circumstances. South Korea is 
positioned in the midst of many nuclear tensions: it is a direct neighbour to one of the youngest 
nuclear weapon states, North Korea. It is also positioned in the midst of changing regional relations, 
and close to aspiring superpower China.
6.1 Nuclear history South Korea
During his presidency between 1963 and 1979, Park Chung Hee was a believer in nuclear weapons. 
During  the  early  1970s,  Park  wanted  a  nuclear  weapons  capability  in  order  to  gain  military 
independence from Washington, gain strategic superiority over the North and enhance his domestic 
prestige. As the U.S. was preparing to leave Vietnam, Park argued that the Washington might leave 
Korea too and it  became time to not  remain dependant on the U.S.  but  establish own military 
superiority over the North.  142
In  1972,  South  Korea  began  unannounced  negotiations  with  France  for  a  small-scale 
reprocessing facility. During early 1974, the U.S. found out after word of a preliminary contract for 
the plant  leaked out.  This  resulted in  angry reactions from Washington,  to  which South Korea 
reacted that  the U.S.  permitted Japan to have reprocessing facilities  so South Korea should be 
permitted this as well. Reprocessing facilities would, just like in Japan, be important to build South 
Korea’s  civilian  nuclear  power  program and  would  not  per  definition  implicate  a  program for 
military purposes.  However,  the U.S. still  suspected that South Korea wanted to decrease its 143
dependence  on  Washington’s  enriched  uranium  in  order  to  get  more  space  pursuing  nuclear 
weapons ambitions. It was revealed later by a South Korean journalist that the contract provided 
South Korea with twenty kilogram plutonium per year, so much that it would be enough for two or 
three nuclear warheads. After the contract of 1974, the American anxieties were intensified during 
early 1975, when South Korea and Canada signed a contract for a heavy water reactor.  During 144
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late 1975 and early 1976, the United States increased pressure on South Korea in order to contain its 
nuclear ambitions.  Washington, especially then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, voiced threats 145
to break the U.S.-South Korean alliance in order to terminate South Korea’s nuclear program. These 
actions  resulted in South Korea’s accession to the NPT in April 1975 and signing the safeguards 
agreement in November 1975.  146147
In 1978, South Korea resumed secret discussions with France in order to bring back to life 
the plans for importing an reprocessing plant. After President Park was assassinated, Chun Doo 
Hwan rose to power after a military coup and he needed U.S. support in order to legitimize his 
regime. The U.S. quickly found out about the secret discussions, so Chun Doo Hwan terminated 
aspects of the nuclear program that Washington deemed suspicious. However, despite his approach, 
the U.S. successfully terminated the entire project.  In December 1991, then president Roh Tae 148
Woo pushed through the  Joint  Declaration on the  Denuclearisation of  the  Korean Peninsula,  a 
North-South disarmament agreement, regardless of much resistance among the pro-nuclear hawks 
in South Korea. This resistance caused tensions between moderates and pro-nuclear South Koreans, 
which lasted until the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement, of which the 1991 agreement formed a basis, 
with North Korea, negotiated by the U.S..149
During October 2004, South Korea admitted to the IAEA that between 1980 and then, it had 
conducted  experiments  and  activities  on  uranium  conversion  and  -enrichment  and  plutonium 
separation, which were not declared to the IAEA immediately.  On November 26, 2004, the IAEA 150
Board of Governors concluded that, although failing to report the activities was of serious concern, 
the  amounts  of  nuclear  material  involved  were  not  of  significant  amount  and  there  was  no 
implication that the experiments have continued.151
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6.2 South Korea and the non-proliferation regime
South Korea has one of the biggest nuclear programs in the world. At the moment, South Korea gets 
about 30% of its electricity needs from nuclear power, which makes it one of the world’s most 
prominent nuclear energy countries. Nuclear energy has for a long time been a strategic priority for 
South Korea however, the current president Moon Jae-In is making plans to phase it out.  This 152
part  discusses  South Korea’s  relations with the main enforcers  of  the non-proliferation regime, 
South Korea’s position within Asia, and its relations to the NPT and IAEA.
South Korea has extensive ties with China, as well as the United States, Korea’s historical 
and cultural ties to China are extensive, as a great deal of Korean culture came to the peninsula 
from China.  After the World War II, Sino-South Korean relations were influenced greatly by the 153
Cold War. After the Korean War, China was one of the greatest allies of North Korea, while the 
South was anti-communist and an ally of the U.S. Since the end of the Cold War, ties between 
South Korea and China have been growing. In 2003, China became South Korea’s largest trading 
partner,  surpassing the U.S. who held that position since 1960.  However, because of China’s 154
regional and global rise, increasing weight on the international stage and geographic proximity to 
the Korean Peninsula, an active debate arose within South Korea on whether, or to what extent, its 
strategic security changed.  Despite these regional concerns, the Sino-South Korean relations are 155
important and still growing.  However, a crucial element of South Korea’s security is its alliance 156
with the United States. As almost every relationship, the U.S.-South Korean alliance has known 
both good and bad times, however leaders of both states have continued to affirm the importance of 
the relationship. During the course of the relationship, South Korea’s economic and military power 
grew immensely. This accounted for changes in the force structure, responsibilities and command 
relationships  of  the  alliance.  For  example,  Seoul  has  taken  on  a  greater  share  of  the  alliance 
responsibilities.  As the economic ties between South Korea and China have been growing, the 157
U.S.  has  been  expressing  concerns  that  South  Korea’s  intentions  may  be  to  drift  away  from 
Washington to  Beijing in  terms of  strategic  relations,  and not  just  turn to  China for  economic 
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relations.   However, it can be argued that because of the regional instability in East Asia, the 158
South Korea-U.S. relations for years to come remain an important and stabilising factor in ensuring 
regional peace and security.159
The most complicated thing about discussing nuclear proliferation and stability in Asia is 
that it is very unclear and hard to accurately predict how all the current nuclear issues in Asia will 
play out in the future. At the beginning of the century, observers argued that a domino-effect could 
find place in Asia if one state were to acquire nuclear weapons.  If Japan were to actively pursue 160
nuclear weapons, it may provide South Korea with enough motivation to follow. If either Japan and/
or South Korea would fall  to nuclear weapons, there is a chance that Taiwan abandon its non-
proliferation agreements as well.  However, more recent works argue that security guarantees are 161
more important dan is assumed then, otherwise all those states would have nuclear weapons by now 
(as a result  from, for example, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program). It  is  also argued that 
because of the increasing military, political and economic power of South Korea, this state may play 
an important role in helping to maintain peace and stability in East Asia.162
In 2009, Pierre Goldschmidt, former head of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, wrote an 
paper  that  discussed  concrete  steps  to  improve  the  non-proliferation  regime.  In  this  article,  he 
mentions the case of South Korea regularly and states how the case of South Korea, among others, 
was  handled  in  a  incorrect  manner  by  the  IAEA,  setting  a  damaging  precedent.  In  his 163
recommendations, Goldschmidt argues that in order to strengthen the regime, the IAEA Board of 
Governors  should  correct  damaging  precedents  by  acknowledging  that  certain  cases,  of  which 
South  Korea  is  one,  were  in  noncompliance  with  their  safeguard  agreements.  According  to 
Goldschmidt, in line with righting wrong precedents, working towards a series of generic solutions 
that would lay out a more extensive protocol for responding to noncompliance would be necessary 
steps in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
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6.3 Conclusion
This  chapter  discussed  the  nuclear  latency-status  of  South  Korea.  It  discussed  South-Korea’s 
nuclear history, which indicated that, already from years ago, it used much of the same arguments 
for a nuclear program as Iran is using now: South Korea wants a nuclear program, because Japan is 
also allowed to have one.  Throughout its nuclear history, Washington has been very involved and 
controlling of South Korea. However, its relations and security guarantees did not mean that South 
Korea was discouraged from pursuing nuclear activities. However, scholars argue that even though 
the security alliances are not the same as they were during the Cold War, it seems like they are still 
functioning  enough  to  help  Asia  refrain  from  falling  into  a  domino  effect  after  North  Korea 
developed nuclear weapons. This indicates how important it is for the main enforcers, in this case 
the United States, to try to remain as involved in enforcing the regime as possible.
Only in 2004, South Korea admitted to the IAEA that it had done nuclear experiments and -
activities since 1980, which were not declared until that moment. The case of South Korea indicates 
why it would be a good idea for the regime to focus on how to incorporate the resulting measures, 
like the Additional Protocol and (parts of) the JCPOA, into the general system of safeguards. These 
two examples of extra additional safeguards have proven to work. Different approaches for different 
cases have the risk of setting damaging precedents: being able to draw one line will prevent these 
precedents as much as possible. 
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Chapter 7
Conclusion 
This thesis argues that the non-proliferation regime currently encounters strains because the regime, 
which was created in the context of the global political situation during the Cold War, no longer fits 
the  current  circumstances.  The  question  that  this  thesis  formulated  an  answer  to  is:  “does  the 
concept of nuclear latency provide the basis for an adaptation of the Cold War non-proliferation 
regime?” This thesis  argues that  acknowledging nuclear latency in the non-proliferation regime 
would provide an adaptation that the non-proliferation regime needs in order to function better in 
the current world. This thesis first introduced the concept of non-proliferation and the theoretical 
discussion surrounding it, followed by three case studies that provided practical examples of how 
the  non-proliferation  regime  handled  these  cases  and,  in  combination  with  the  first  chapters, 
discussed how acknowledging nuclear  latency helps  the  regime to  respond more  effectively  to 
current circumstances.
The  first  chapter  discussed  the  nuclear  proliferation  debate  and  the  origins  of  the  non-
proliferation regime and its cornerstone, the NPT. It discussed the dynamics of nuclear proliferation 
and how the non-proliferation regime is based on a global power structure that is very different 
from  the  current  situation.  It  looked  at  how  nuclear  behaviour  is  usually  influenced  by  a 
combination of technological-, domestic- and external factors. However, it is clear that the status of 
a state’s security environment is an important factor,  generally speaking. Although proliferation 
optimist Waltz is seen as an authority on nuclear proliferation, since the post-Cold War years his 
arguments have lost some of their explanatory power, and increasingly more research and attention 
has gone into the pessimistic side of proliferation, arguing that in an multipolar world proliferation 
mainly  makes  an  unstable  environment  more  unstable.  This  would  mean  that  any  solution  to 
adapting the regime preferably needs to promote non-proliferation.
Discussing  the  history  and  establishment  of  the  non-proliferation  regime  and  the  NPT 
revealed that  many problems have arisen because the IAEA for long had too limited access to 
nuclear sites to effectively monitor nuclear developments and work towards non-proliferation, and 
that the NNWS feel discriminated by the NWS. In response to having too limited access to work 
efficiently, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol. Subsequently, 
this has resulted in many states having signed and ratified Additional Protocols next to the standard 
IAEA safeguard  agreements.  This  means  that  in  those  states  the  IAEA’s  abilities  to  verify  the 
peaceful purposes of nuclear material have increased, and more transparency from nuclearly active 
states is ensured. With regards to being discriminating, the non-proliferation regime is a product of 
the Cold War, and it was clearly drafted with the interests of the nuclear weapon states in mind. The 
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NWS favour unequal prioritisation of the non-proliferation pillar over equal prioritisation over all 
three pillars of the NPT, leaving the NNWS feeling unfairly treated. This chapter indicated how a 
solution is needed that restores the credibility and position of the NWS, especially that of the United 
States, in the non-proliferation regime in order to keep further proliferation under control. It also 
indicated that the non-proliferation regime has been taking up measures in order to gain greater 
access and transparency from NNWS in order to better control nuclear (non-)proliferation.
The  second  chapter  concluded  that  some  essential  changes  in  global  power  relations 
occurred after the end of the Cold War and that these different power relations have had crucial 
effects on the system of security guarantees, one of the main drivers for nuclear proliferation. The 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  hegemonic  position  of  Washington  are  likely  to  have 
contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons because of the subsequent diminishing of the 
bilateral nuclear system and its associated security guarantees, and the unpredictability surrounding 
Washington’s behaviour on enforcing the global non-proliferation regime. Whether self-appointed 
or not, the U.S. has for years been one of the main enforcers of the non-proliferation regime, with 
the most interest in maintaining it. This chapter emphasized that a possible solution must restore the 
credibility and position of the NWS in the non-proliferation regime, and that the current status of 
global  power  distribution  accounts  for  an  unstable  international  environment  for  many  states, 
triggering nuclear proliferation.
The  third  chapter  focussed  on  nuclear  latency  and  explained  why  it  is  important  to 
understand this concept as a part of the non-proliferation regime in a post-Cold War multipolar 
world. It  firstly discussed the current importance of nuclear energy as an alternative fuel in the 
global energy equation, which makes it hard for the regime to deny any state nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes. Explaining what nuclear latency means - to have the technological capability to 
produce nuclear weapons, but deciding not to do so - clarifies the fact that not only possessing 
nuclear weapons accounts for reactions from the international environment, but also just possessing 
dual-use nuclear technology will cause that as well. In a relatively unstable world like the multipolar 
situation  we  encounter  now,  proliferation  of  weapons  is  prohibited  but  states  can  and,  in  this 
unstable  environment,  want  to  prepare  maximally  for  the  possibility  of  maybe  ever  acquiring 
nuclear weapons in a short space of time. So there is a possibility that nuclear latency becomes 
more common, beyond even the forty or so states that already possess these capabilities, and should 
therefore be clarified in terms of the operational response of the IAEA in enforcing the NPT.
The following three chapters were case studies on respectively Japan, Iran and South Korea. 
The Iran chapter indicated how the NPT leaves room for states, Iran being the leading example, to 
develop technology that can be used for both civilian uses and nuclear weapons. The JCPOA has 
been considered a success in terms of changing Iranian behaviour on nuclear matters, but it is not 
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clear yet to what extent the safeguards from the JCPOA can mean anything for the general system 
of safeguards of the IAEA. The cases of Japan and South Korea indicated that not possessing a clear 
and consistent way to respond to noncompliance can set unfortunate precedents for other examples 
of noncompliance. Not accurately elaborating on what to do with the dual-use nature of nuclear 
technology has become a central problem for the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. 
That  is  why  recognising  nuclear  latency,  i.e.  acknowledging  the  need  for  civilian  purposes  of 
nuclear energy but discouraging nuclear weapon programs, will help the non-proliferation regime. 
In the past few years, the non-proliferation regime has taken action in order to work towards solving 
the issue of working with dual-use nuclear technologies, as the Additional Protocol and the JCPOA 
indicate. Although the Additional Protocol is adopted by more and more states, and the JCPOA 
worked well but specifically only for the Iran case, nuclear latency is not yet fully recognised by the 
non-proliferation regime. However, the case studies have pointed out that greater authority of the 
IAEA, in the form of the Additional Protocols and the JCPOA, has been working effectively in 
better controlling sensitive nuclear activities. A next step could be to try and translate efforts like the 
Model Additional Protocol and the JCPOA into the IAEA’s general safeguards, in order to establish 
a more comprehensive system of safeguards agreements that can be applied to every, or at least 
most,  states.  This  would  also  help  the  regime  towards  drawing  one  clear  line  for  every  state 
(preventing  the  possibility  of  different/unfair  courses  of  action  for  different  states)  on  what  is 
allowed and what is not in the grey area of dual-use technologies. It is also of importance that the 
NWS, and especially the most important player and regime enforcer within the regime, the United 
States,  maintain  a  strong  and  deliberate  focus  on  non-proliferation  in  order  to  enhance  their 
credibility and commitment and to keep the non-proliferation regime effective in the 21st century.
The suggestions provided in this thesis are first steps that could add to strengthening the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime in the current multipolar world. However, the question that nuclear 
latency ultimately brings, is how the regime can encourage peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and at 
the  same time minimise  proliferation  risks.  If  this  question  finds  an  answer,  the  root  of  the 164
problems that the non-proliferation regime currently encounters will be solved to a great extent.  
 “Capability Versus Intent: The Latent Threat of Nuclear Proliferation,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 164
June 14, 2007. https://thebulletin.org/capability-versus-intent-latent-threat-nuclear-proliferation-0.
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